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Why the Balubas and the Luluas Cannot Co-Exist

Like many of our readers we have been appalled from time to time by news stories out of the Congo which tell about savage outbursts of tribal warfare between the Balubas and the Luluas. We have often wondered idly why—now that the Congo is free—their chiefs cannot meet and shake hands. African scholars informed us this displays a typical white man's ignorance. The Balubas and the Luluas are divided by grave differences, and cannot easily be reconciled. The Balubas feel it is difficult to co-exist with a tribe like the Luluas who do not believe in *ju-ju*, while the Luluas feel it a duty to liberate the bush from a tribe which seeks by using coral shells as medium of exchange to monopolize trade in cows and 12-year old girls. Both the Balubas and the Luluas regard themselves as peace-loving but both are convinced that peace will not really be secure until the other is exterminated. We are told that this mutual suspicion has been exacerbated recently when a Baluba was caught peeping from a tree top at the sacred puberty rites of the Luluas. The Balubas claimed that in carrying out this aerial surveillance they were acting in the common interest of the entire Congo since Lulua boys are taught at these rites to use poisoned arrows for surprise attack. Thereupon a Lulua leader angrily told a Baluba leader to his face that he was fit only to mind the children with the women while the rest of the men went antelope hunting. After so statesmanlike an utterance, every right thinking tribesman on both sides felt that there was nothing to do but prepare for war to the death.

African Blacks and European Pinks

I might have dismissed this background information as silly primitive stuff were it not that I recalled a recent night session of the Security Council on the Congo crisis which I attended. Looking at the scene through the eyes of the black men from the new States waiting to be heard by the Council, I realized for the first time how alike Mr. Zorin and Sir Patrick Dean and James Wadsworth must look to the new representatives from Africa. All three—Zorin, Dean and Wadsworth—had high balding foreheads and pinkish skins, wore the same clothes, seemed unmistakably and interchangeably of the same race. An African Baluba fresh from the bush, or even a Lulua who had been to Oxford, might have been forgiven if he wondered for a moment just what was the burning difference that could bring these pink-faced Europeans to the brink of mutual destruction. I touch on this with no implication of racial inferiority. It takes more than one generation fully to appreciate the nuances of a theology which makes mass incineration of the atheistical excusable, or to grasp an ideology which teaches that millions of fellow workers may justly be liberated by thermonuclear intercontinental ballistic bombardment. Even after an education in the West, the Baluba or Lulua may miss all our higher spiritualities and see in U.S. and U.S.S.R. only two industrial societies mass producing standardized mentalities and alike intolerant of those suspected of deviating from them. It takes longer absorption in our ways to understand why it is impossible for a Christian gentleman like Mr. Eisenhower or a devoted Marxist-Leninist like Mr. Khrushchov to meet and shake hands without first exacting some humiliating abasement from the other even to stop the drift to war. It is from the ranks of the newer, less developed, in some ways less civilized countries that this unthinking demand for a meeting between them comes.

So we go to press here in Washington with some equanimity as we await the outcome of the vote in the UN General Assembly on the resolution of the five Afro-Asian neutrals still pressing for an Eisenhower-Khrushchov meeting both have rejected. It may comfort Mr. Nehru and Mr. Nkrumah and their colleagues to realize that if they have trouble plumbing the abyss which divides us from the Russians, we are equally unclear as to just why Luluas continue to massacre Balubas, or indeed why the heirs of Gandhi are prepared to make war over an obscure place called Kashmir. Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchov are only honoring mankind's most cherished behavior pattern.

Kennedy As Silly As Herter on Ghana

A few days after Secretary Herter was foolish enough to slur Ghana and its leader Nkrumah as in the Soviet orbit, Senator Kennedy made a foreign policy speech in Syracuse. He had a choice of alternatives in dealing with the incident. Like the British, he could have deplored this as another example of clumsy diplomacy. He chose instead to agree with Mr. Herter's evaluation and add Ghana to the list of countries where (in Kennedy's words) "the cause of freedom is in serious trouble." To say that "the cause of freedom" is threatened in Ghana because Nkrumah took a neutralist line at the UN will seem to Africans another example of the vapid oversimplifications which make it so difficult to talk political sense in the USA. Other nations in Kennedy's alarmist list included, of course, Cuba (on which he is hopeless) and Laos. On the latter, we suggest that readers compare the Senator's Nellie-the-Cloak-Model melodrama about "the tiny nation of Laos . . . struggling to keep its head above a Communist tide" with the insights into Laotian events given the UN that same day (see page 3) by Prince Sihanouk from neighboring Cambodia. Since the Senator is supposed to be advised by Stevenson and Bowles, we don't know why he sounds so much like Hearst and Luce.

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The Financial Shenanigans Surrounding the Congo's Stock in Union Miniere

More Light on the Rockefeller Interest in the Congo Struggle

If the Rockefeller family were not a sacred cow of U.S. politics and journalism, the Democrats might be making capital of the Rockefeller interest in the struggle now going on in the Belgian Congo over the future of Katanga. We called attention in our issue of Sept. 26 to the fact that the Rockefellers had been buying stock in *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*, one of the world's largest mining companies which dominates the province of Katanga.

We have since turned up some additional background on the Rockefeller interest. *Union Minière* was formed in 1906 by a combination of Belgian and British interests. The British entered the picture through a company called Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., "which had been organized," according to the *Wall Street Journal* (Jan. 13, 1959) "as part of Cecil Rhodes' scheme to gain control of Congolese mineral resources."

Their Debut in Africa

In 1950, the Bank of England sold 1,667,961 shares in TCL to an Anglo-Belgian group which in turn sold 600,000 shares to "an American group." "It is of interest, also of importance, to note," *The Times* (London) reported Nov. 3, 1950, "that the International Basic Economy Corporation and Mr. David Rockefeller are among those associated in this purchase, for the corporation is a highly important undertaking, formed by the Rockefeller family interests, which has so far confined its activities to South America. This is, in fact, the first time that it has turned to Africa."

On February 7, 1959, just one month after the outbreak of the disorders in Leopoldville which led to the grant of independence for the Congo, David Rockefeller was being received in Leopoldville by the Belgian Governor-General. Rockefeller was in Africa under the sponsorship of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. Rockefeller went to tour the Inga, contemplated site of a vast $9 billion hydro-electric development, accompanied by John Watts, head of the African division of the Rockefellers' Chase Manhattan Bank, and William Burden, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Rockefeller went on from the Congo to Johannesburg, South Africa, where he called the opening of a new branch of Chase Manhattan indication of the "confidence we feel in the economic potential of South Africa *(New York Times*, Feb. 8 and 11, 1959).

In addition to their holdings in Tanganyika Concessions, the Rockefellers have been acquiring a direct interest in Union Minière. In a study of Union Minière and its interlocking Tanganyika Concessions published by the London *Observer* (July 10), that paper reported, "There is an even bigger fish with an interest in both companies. The Belgians have just brought off an exchange whereby the Rockefeller holding in U.M.H.K. was swapped for shares in a Congo finance company, thus transforming it in effect into a portfolio investment in U.M.H.K. without possibilities of control. For the Belgians, this means the heaven-sent chance of American investment without strings; it is said even now that Rockefeller buying is putting a floor under the price of U.M.H.K. For the Rockefellers and anyone else with a long purse and strong nerves, this may yet be a brilliant speculation. The ore is magnificent, and so is the organization; the only doubt is political."

The key political question, as we pointed out in our issue of Sept. 26, revolves around the fate of the stock which the Belgian Congo long held in Union Minière. This stock interest goes back to the days when Belgian King Leopold II exploited the Congo as his private property. He set up a company called the Comité Special du Katanga to develop the mineral riches of Katanga. Two-thirds of the stock was assigned to the Congo "Free State" as it was called. When world-wide outcry against the brutality with which Leopold exploited the natives forced him in 1910 to turn his possession over to Belgium, the Belgian Congo State retained this stock interest.

CSK in turn was the largest single stockholder in Union Minière, having been the corporate vehicle through which Leopold in 1906 had formed Union Minière in concert with Cecil Rhodes' Tanganyika Concessions.

"When independence became inevitable," said an account in the *Washington Sunday Star* (July 31), "the Belgians decided not to let these profits fall into the hands of their native successors. Thus the CSK was dissolved last year, and a new deal was negotiated in Brussels. . . . It was agreed that the new government would keep control over 22.5 percent of Union Minière [and certain other companies]. . . . That seemed fair enough, but the Belgians made a mental reservation. It was not specified whether those assets would be transferred to the central Congo government or to the provincial government of the Katanga. Today, the U.M. and the other firms involved affirm that they mean, of course, the Katanga government. That is the basis on which they are now backing plans for a secession of the Katanga. They found themselves an ally in the person of Moise Tshombe."

What de Gaulle Feared

"PARIS—President Charles de Gaulle fears a Korea-type war will engulf Negro Africa unless the Western powers scotch the attempt to detach Katanga province from the new Republic of the Congo. . . .

"In General de Gaulle's eyes, the Belgians court an even graver disaster than has already happened if they believe that they can sever Katanga from the rest of the Congo and maintain it as a sort of economic redoubt controlled by their big private interests."

—Washington Sunday Star, July 31

"We have got to be ready to fight for it [freedom] whether it is in Korea or Hungary or Congo."

—Nelson Rockefeller (TV Open Hearing, Sept. 4)

The Kind of "Free Enterprise" Union Miniere Seeks to Preserve in Katanga

"The whole Katanga is, in fact, a 'company town.' Union Miniere owns the electric generating plant, the chemical industry and through interlocking directorates is in close association with the Compagnie du Chemins de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga which has a monopoly of all railroads in the area.

"Free enterprise in the Katanga and in the Belgian Congo generally does not go much beyond retail trade and a few manufacturing service industries of local scope, and one of the bitterest controversies now going on in the Congo and in Brussels is the question of mass white colonization.

"The small colonials—planters, farmers, traders, merchants, and small manufacturers—want the doors thrown wide open to white settlers. The great firms are opposed to it. They want black labor, not white. They see the white man as an elite class of managers, technicians and leaders. No man in the Congo—black or white—has any vote. And the companies are afraid that white mass colonization would inevitably lead to a demand for unions, elections, free enterprise. They frankly say they do not want any 'poor white trash' in the Congo."

—N.Y. Herald Tribune, Special Sunday Supplement on Belgium, Feb. 15, 1958

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Lifting the Curtain on the Western Intrigue Behind the Fighting in Laos

Cambodia's Ruler at the UN Eloquently Voices Neutral Hopes and Fears

Though given slight attention by our press the important speech for the neutrals at the General Assembly Sept. 29 was not Macmillan's but the eloquent appeal made by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, particularly for the new light it threw on the crisis in Laos. We give excerpts from it here:

ON THE "LITTLE" ARMS RACE: "'Out-moded' conventional weapons are . . . distributed with touching generosity to countries courted by various imperialisms. . . . This secondary aspect of the arms race . . . is in fact the aspect which is the cause of growing concern among our people. Today, when the great Powers speak of disarmament, it would seem that they think primarily in terms of nuclear weapons, and that they do not attach sufficient importance to these obsolete toys which were only responsible for the annihilation of a few tens of millions of people during the Second World War. . . . What we beg of them is to renounce this arms race, to renounce the arming of the small and medium-sized countries, to renounce the moral armament of peoples, which seek only to live in peace, by trying to convince them to take part in an anti-communist or an anti-imperialist struggle and thus killing each other under these false pretexts."

ON ADMITTING CHINA: "While small nations numbering 1, 2 or 5 million people, such as ours, sit in our Organization, it seems senseless and tragic that the most densely populated nation of the world, and one of the most deserving should still be treated as a pariah. . . . Certain critics of China regularly oppose its admission to the United Nations. They justify their obstruction by referring to the Tibet 'affair' and the border differences between India and China. Yet India, the country primarily concerned . . . remains convinced of the necessity of admitting China. . . . Have these adamant critics ever realized that certain members of the UN are very far from following a proper course as regards their weaker neighbors and has it ever occurred to them that these nations are unworthy of sitting among us?

ON INTRIGUE IN LAOS: "Laos certainly does not deserve a situation in which certain foreign agents or rulers cynically and ruthlessly sacrifice Laos on the altar of an anti-communist psychosis, and favor secession, coldly contemplating the abandonment of the northern part of the country to communism and the creation of a so-called anti-communist bastion in the south, a south which will prove to be only an illusion. I can tell these strategists that their plan for division is doomed to failure because South Laos is just as susceptible to the infiltrations of the Pathet Lao as South Vietnam is to the Viet Minh."

FOR NEUTRAL BUFFER ZONE: "Cambodia believes it would be in the general interest to create a neutralized zone made up of Cambodia and Laos . . . the two blocs by common accord would agree to . . . avoid any further rivalry in this zone. . . . It should not be forgotten that the two great colonial powers of the last century, France and the United Kingdom, at times resorted to the creation and maintenance of such buffer States between their foreign posessions."

WHY SMALLER POWERS ARE NEUTRAL: "Certain [Western] newspapers claim that neutrality is an absurdity, and non-alignment a form of cowardice. . . . The committed nations . . . should show a greater understanding. . . . Perhaps they will admit that their chief concerns are quite remote from those of these countries, for which the problems of under development is the paramount one. How can one conceive of a sincere and genuine political alignment among nations whose peoples are separated by living standards which range from opulence to dire poverty and even endemic starvation? The recent events in Cuba, Japan, South Korea and Laos confirm this attraction towards the neutral position and justify a refusal to take part in the dangerous game proposed by the great Powers. This attitude adopted by more than a third of mankind is not absurd or cowardly but is rather simply an expression of the instinct of self-preservation linked with a very human yearning for liberty."

Sihanouk Opposes Khrushchov Plan

"I feel it useful to set forth the position of Cambodia regarding the proposal submitted by Premier Khrushchov that the Secretary General's post be replaced by an executive board of three members, representing the Western bloc, the socialist camp and finally the neutralist camp. This is an interesting proposal but we do not share the views of the head of the Soviet Government for the following reasons. We feel that we should avoid having our Organization split up into rival camps, for such a break-up of our Organization would prevent our United Nations from fully playing its proper role, particularly of being the sole guarantee of the survival and independence of the small nations. To extend this division into the Secretariat might well make the Secretariat ineffectual.

"On the contrary, it seems to us that the Secretariat as conceived at the present time, headed by a strictly neutral personality, standing above faction and pressure, is the best possible guarantee of impartiality for the non-aligned nations. We would not go so far as to pretend that any man, however neutral he may be, will never err, but what we are certain of is that an executive board could act only if the three members of the board were unanimous, and in the present situation, this is unthinkable; hence, the action of such a board could only result in mediocre compromises."

—Prince Sihanouk (Cambodia) at the UN Sept. 29

The Kind of Undercover Cloak-and-Dagger "Aid" the Uncommitted Nations Fear

"Certain newspapers in the free world have contended that the neutral or neutralist countries are taking advantage of the rivalry of the two camps, playing one camp against the other with diabolical skill and deriving tremendous material and moral profits therefrom. . . . The well-known magazine, Time, which is greatly interested in our country, wrote the following—though its humor was certainly in rather poor taste: 'Sihanouk unveiled a second rule of aidmanship: always bite the hand that feeds you.' We are accustomed to this kind of friendly treatment. . . .

"Many may not be well aware of something which the small nations receiving assistance know only too well: that frequently friendly assistance carried out under official agreements is followed by clandestine and far less friendly assistance. This last form of assistance, which is never mentioned and which gives rise to indignant hues and cries whenever it is mentioned, can arise in various guises—either as subversion or as the supporting and buttressing or completely artificial creation of conflicting groups or as the purchase of stooges believed to be strong enough to bring about the secession of certain provinces.

"If the conferring of such official assistance must bring with it obligations contrary to our convictions, to our real interests and to our honor . . . then we prefer to be the wolf in Aesop's fable rather than the dog. We do not bite the hand that feeds our people, we bite only the other hand, the hand which is trying to slay us."

—Prince Sihanouk (Cambodia) at the UN, Sept. 29

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To Stop Foot-Dragging, One Must Warn the Pentagon as Well as Moscow

Humphrey's Own Report Rebuts His June Nuclear Test Deadline

The printed preface by Senator Humphrey to his valuable Disarmament Subcommittee report on the nuclear test talks does not suggest that the U.S. resume testing if agreement is not reached by next June. This appears only in the Senator's press release accompanying submission of the report. The suggestion brought him recognition from the enemies of an agreement—top page one billing in the *New York Times* which usually buries his statements and a respectful bow from Chairman McCone of the AEC but it will dismay the friends of disarmament.

The Logic of A Deadline

If the evidence showed that the Russians alone were guilty of foot-dragging in the Geneva talks, there would be logic in a deadline as a means of putting pressure on them. But the Senator's preface to his own report shows otherwise. The Russians have indeed often moved at snail's pace; a striking example is the key question of an inspection quota. This was proposed by them over a year ago, Senator Humphrey reports, but it was not only 12 months later that they finally came forward with a figure—"totally inadequate and unrealistic"—of how many inspections they would permit. It was 3 a year.

On the other hand, the U.S. according to Senator Humphrey has been "plagued" by "an ambivalence of purpose." At times "we go for long weeks and even months without making major concrete or constructive moves." The point of the Senator's praise for Ambassador Wadsworth as a long-suffering hero of the talks is not only that he has had to take "constant abuse . . . and unreasonable demands" from the Soviet side but has also had "to mark time for long periods while the U.S. Government back in Washington has attempted to make up its mind."

"Ambivalence of purpose" is a tactful way to say that the Pentagon and the AEC are both opposed to a nuclear test agreement, and have done their best to undercut the national policy declared by the President. While Mr. Eisenhower pays little attention to the complex details of the negotiations, the Pentagon and the AEC are in a position through their experts to slow down the talks from within and through their spokesman to poison public opinion against an agreement, as does Mr. McCone by his constant sly "surmise" that the Russians "must be" testing secretly while the talks go on.

To set a deadline may put pressure on the Russians to speed up an agreement. It may also encourage the Pentagon AEC crowd to intensify their efforts, knowing that if they can find new stumbling blocks and hold out until June, victory will be theirs. This is why a deadline is a pitfall.

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